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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

PSYCHOSEXUAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
GENDER AND SEXUAL IDENTITIES:
COURTS CONSTRUCT THE TITLE
VII FEMALE
Since 1966, a year which marked legal acceptance of sex reassignment surgery, society has witnessed significant clinical and diagnostic advances to treat the gender dysphoric. 1 With the ability to
create one sex from the anatomy of another, medical science has
obliged lawyers and courts to address issues of sexual identity, gender identity, and enforceable redress from employment discrimination. 2 Recently, employees claiming to have been wrongfully
discharged have demanded judicial recognition of unforeseen,
emerging forms of sex-based discrimination. Notwithstanding the
remedial nature of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, most
courts have defined "sex" according to the traditional notions of bi3
ological sex.
Title VII proscribes unlawful employment practices in all conditions of employment because of an individual's "sex."'4 Specifi1. Gender dysphoria, commonly referred to as transsexualism, is being
recognized, accepted, and treated in increasing numbers. There are an estimated five thousand postoperative transsexuals and forty to fifty thousand preoperative transsexuals in the United States. Kopka, The Legal Status of the
Postoperative Transsexual, 1983 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 456, 469. It is also estimated that over one thousand sex conversions are performed annually on
Americans. Twardy, Medicolegal Aspects of Transsexualism, 1980 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 249, 253.
2. "Gender identity" is defined as one's mental perception of oneself as a
man or a woman, and functions as one's intrinsic guideline to appropriate behavior. "Sexual identity" is defined by the anatomic attributes of the individual
as a man or a woman. See Stoller, A Contributionto the Study of GenderIdentity, 45 INT'L J. OF PSYCHOANAL. 220 (1964).
3. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 105 S.Ct. 2023 (1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
662 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D.Md. 1977);
Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1196, 1199 (D.N.J. 1975), affd mern., 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
897 (1976); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457
(N.D. Cal. 1975), affd mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
4. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, provides:
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cally, this provision was enacted to remedy disparate treatment
based upon stereotypical concepts of the sexes, conditions common
to only one sex, or status as related to sex. Because the language of
Title VII is broadly phrased, it has warranted sweeping, reformative
interpretations. In determining whether the sex-related factors of
gender dysphoria and sex reassignment invoke the protections of
the "sex" provision, however, courts have been disinclined to extend Title VII relief to the gender dysphoric. Clearly, whether the
legal sex of the gender dysphoric is the sex of the assumed gender
role, or even whether Title VII is viable based upon this sexual consideration, generates sensitive legal issues, and therefore calls for
judicial construction of the "Title VII female."
Questions of sexual deviation frequently provoke inimical responses. That matter cannot be corrected through the courts. Title
VII could conceivably be operated, however, to counteract "the negative ostrich-like position" 5 that exists in some employers towards
their affected employees. The American Psychiatric Association
has diagnosed transsexualism as a psychosexual disorder which features "a persistent sense of discomfort and inappropriateness about
one's anatomic sex and a persistent wish to be rid of one's genitals
and to live as a member of the other sex."'6 The gender dysphoric
suffers, essentially, from a conflict between his gender identity and
sexual identity, both of which are fundamental components of one's
personality. Hence, the individual seeks to alter his or her anatomic, genital appearance in an effort to achieve harmony between
mind and body. Such apparently drastic treatment is not capricious
or freakish; rather, sex reassignment is generally accepted as "a
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2)

to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-

ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Because "sex" was added as a floor amendment one day
before the House approved Title VII, there are no legislative hearings or debates on that significant word. See Developments in the Law-Employment
Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv.
1109, 1167 (1971).
5. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1983),
rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2023 (1985).
6. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261-62 (3d ed. 1980).
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medical necessity."'7
In determining the viability of Title VII in this context, courts
have been influenced by medical and psychiatric experts' opinions
concerning a fitting definition of "sex." One of the primary inquiries focuses on the distinction between psychological sex and chromosomal sex. Surgical ablation or alteration of the patient's
genitals changes the patient to assume the phenotype of the opposite sex. The procedure, however, does not change the patient's
chromosomal sex. Many mental health doctors declare that psychological sex, rather than chromosomal sex, is the single most important consideration in determining the social and legal sex of an
individual.8 Moreover, many courts have found that sex is not determined solely by physical attributes, such as chromosomes, but
also by other factors, such as external genitalia, hormonal balance,
and social orientation.9
In Richardsv. United States Tennis Association,1 0 for instance,
a postoperative, male-to-female transsexual was denied admittance
into the women's division of the United States Open Tennis Tournament because she failed to pass the sex-chromatin test. The Richards court held that the defendant's exclusive reliance on the sexchromatin test violated New York's Human Rights Law because
chromosomal structure is not the sole factor involved in determining an individual's sex. The court additionally found that when a
male undergoes a sex conversion, society's "unfounded fears and
misconceptions... must give way to the overwhelming medical evidence that this person is now female."" Therefore, when an individual's gender identity and physical characteristics are no longer
discordant, but are harmonized through surgery, the gender
dysphoric's "sex" should be legally recognized as that of the assumed sex role. Most courts, however, in determining the viability
of Title VII to gender dysphorics, have reasoned that sexual gender
is a simple matter of immutable characteristics, specifically focusing
12
on chromosomal composition.
7. Wein & Remmers, Employment Protection and Gender Dysphoria:
Legal Definitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex and Disability,30
HASTiNGS L.J. 1075, 1081 (1979).
8. Comment, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a
Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288, 290-92 (1975).
9. See M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 83, 355 A.2d 204, 210, cert denied, 71
N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976); Anonymous v. Mellon, 91 Misc. 2d 375, 377, 398
N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1977); In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813, 817, 293
N.Y.S.2d 834, 838 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
10. 93 Misc. 2d 713, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
11. Id. at 717, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
12. For a list of cases which have confronted the issue, see supra note 3.
The Holloway court did concede one key point, however, when it observed that

"transsexuals claiming discrimination because of their sex, male or female,
would clearly state a cause of action under Title VII." 566 F.2d at 664.
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One district court rejected that analysis and theorized that sexbased discrimination emerged in matters concerning discharge
based on gender identity and based on sex reassignment. In departing from conventional judicial reasoning regarding gender
dysphoria and Title VII, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,13

found that a postoperative, male-to-female gender dysphoric had
been discriminated against based on her status as a transsexual and
as a female. Although First Officer Ulane had received a medical
certificate of physical and mental fitness from the Federal Aviation
Administration following the sex conversion, Eastern discharged
Ulane from employment. The district court was persuaded that but
for being a transsexual and but for having had sex reassignment,
the plaintiff would not have been discharged. The court additionally held that Title VII coverage should be extended because the
14
term "sex" literally and scientifically applied to transsexuals.
Three federal circuit courts, including the Seventh Circuit
which reversed Ulane on appeal, have published opinions holding
that the term "sex" in Title VII does not provide relief for transsexuals.15 In denying a remedy, the courts' reasoning has been consistent and analytical. These courts have concluded that "sex" should
be given its "plain meaning," and thus be limited to its traditional
notions. The district court in Ulane, however, found such a construction inconsistent with Title VII's broad language, remedial
purpose, and legislative history.
Although not yet adopted in the gender dysphoric context,
there is a definite trend among courts to construe Title VII in a
broad and liberal manner. For example, the Title VII prohibition of
sex-based discrimination in employment was successfully invoked
by a male who was discharged for resisting the homosexual advances of his supervisor. 16 Title VII has also been held operative
based upon other sex-related factors, including marriage, 17 bearing
13. 581 F. Supp. 821, 839-40 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2023 (1985).
14.

Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825. This holding was based on the court's finding

that "sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes," but also triggers psy-

chological and social considerations. Id. For instance, Judge Grady was motivated in part by an Illinois statute which authorized the issuance of a change of
sex designation, subsequent to sex reassignment, on birth certificates. Id. at
824. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 73-17 (1981). The court reasoned that the
statute manifested a strong social policy in favor of protecting the integrity of
transsexuals. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 824.
15. Uane,742 F.2d at 1087; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748,750
(8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
663 (9th Cir. 1977).
16. Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
17. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971).

1985]

The Title VII Female

or adopting children,' 8 and matters of sexual harassment. 19 Certainly, Congress did not specifically express an intention to proscribe discrimination of that nature when it passed Title VII. Some
courts have observed, however, that a liberal construction is consistent with the statute's broad language and wide-ranging remedial
purpose. Because Congress did not enumerate particular discriminatory practices and did not limit "sex" to certain classes of persons
protected, it must follow that Congress intended to define sex discrimination in the broadest possible terms.
Those courts denying Title VII relief to gender dysphorics,
however, reason that Congress did not intend to provide redress because of various legislative bills which, if passed, would have extended the protective purview of Title VII to matters of "affectional
or sexual preference." 20 Although Congress has explicitly declared
that the sexual preference legislation operates to principally fashion a remedy for homosexuals, the federal circuit courts contend
that the defeated bills make the narrow interpretation of "sex"
proper; consequently, transsexuals cannot recover under Title VII.
In relying on legislation that would have extended Title VII redress
to homosexuals to deny relief to transsexuals, the circuit courts'
reasoning may derive from an unduly cautious, prescriptive stance.
Discrimination against transsexuals, which is based on gender
identity, and discrimination against homosexuals, which is based on
sexual practices, differ intrinsically. Moreover, when a court approves of the analogy between the transsexual condition and the
homosexual condition, the transsexual's claim is doomed to defeat
because courts have consistently applied the "plain meaning" rule
and have held that homosexuals are not protected by Title VII's
"sex" provision. Because Congress has restricted the recent legislation to matters of sexual preferences, and because the transsexual
condition is not similar to that of the homosexual, courts which
have relied on those considerations may have misconstrued Title
VII's legislative purpose.
Giving "sex" its common meaning, one would probably define
the term based on the traditional considerations of physical appearance. This construction has been adopted by a majority of courts
and has accordingly provided for a consistent denial of relief to the
gender dysphoric under Title VII. Two opinions have indicated that
18. Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa
1975).
19. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
20. The term "affectional or sexual preference" means "male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality by orientation or practice, by and
between consenting adults." Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1981: Hearingon
HR 1454 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House

Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982).
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because Title VII was implemented to give greater protection to all
individuals against sex-based discrimination in employment, "sex"
emerges as a much broader term. The statute, therefore, should
function to prohibit discrimination where there is a causal connection to any sex-related factor, and should not simply be dependent
upon whether an individual happens to be recognized as a female or
a male. 21 The minority opinions insist that Title VII's remedial purpose can only be effected when courts read the statute liberally and,
consequently, give "sex" its manifest denotation: discrimination
based upon any sexual consideration.
Frank Lipuma

21. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir.
1977) (Goodwin, J., dissenting); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821,
825 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct.
2023 (1985).

